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INTRODUCTION 
As we all know, the world is trying to recover from two years of fi-
nancial calamities and uncertainty that have roiled the financial markets 
and sovereign nations and cut deeply into the net worth of many inves-
tors.  The “blame game” goes on in the media, the halls of the United 
States Congress, and the SEC.  In the midst of the frenetic swirl, corpo-
rate directors, regulators, and courts are under unprecedented pressure. 
I would like to address the federal and state contexts relating to the 
corporate-governance focus on business risk and the expectations laid at 
the doorstep of directors and officers of U.S. public companies.  Specifi-
cally, I would like to look at the governance landscape through both a 
federal regulatory lens and a state judicial lens as it relates to risk as-
sessment and risk management. 
                                                 
† E. Norman Veasey is a former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court and is now a Senior 
Partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP in Wilmington, Delaware, and New York, New York.  The 
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 1. The print version of the Address differs from the June 4, 2010, presentation. Significant 
legislative changes occurring in the months following the presentation are now mentioned.  Citations 
and footnotes are added to assist the reader. 
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NEW FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
Inside the Beltway in Washington, D.C., a massive piece of federal 
legislation has just been born.  It is the Dodd-Frank Act, which has 
passed the Senate and House and was signed into law by the President on 
July 21, 2010.  It is euphemistically titled “The Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010.”2 
The final Act will have a sweeping regulatory effect on business, 
particularly banking, and will have some effect on corporate governance.  
Mercifully, that latter effect, in itself, will be only marginally intrusive, 
but nevertheless, it is a federal intrusion that is undesirable as a matter of 
principle.  It will not, however, constitute a wholesale federal preemption 
of corporate law and corporate governance.  The bottom line is that the 
Dodd-Frank Act does not alter or eliminate the protections traditionally 
provided to directors by the business judgment rule. 
The governance provisions and the SEC implementation of the au-
thority conferred on the Commission in the legislation will make life 
more challenging for directors.  And it will strengthen the hand of activ-
ist investors.  Particularly problematic is the broad authority conferred on 
the SEC to require mandatory proxy access3 for investors to nominate 
directors on the company’s proxy, under certain circumstances. 
Except to note that corporate management, directors, and general 
counsel of many corporations will be impacted significantly as business 
works its way through the massive regulatory sweep of the legislation, I 
do not plan to discuss those complex regulatory provisions.  What is out-
side the scope of my remarks today are the creation of a Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Bureau (within the Federal Reserve), the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (composed of the heads of the various regu-
latory agencies including the Chairman of the SEC), the permanent status 
conferred on the Investor Advisory Committee established last year by 
the SEC, and the other myriad regulations dealing with heightening capi-
tal, the requirement of orderly wind-down plans of insolvent operations 
                                                 
 2. On July 15, 2010, the conference process was completed, and the Act was sent to the presi-
dent for signature.  H.R. 4173, 101st Cong. (as reported by the Committee of Conference, June 29, 
2010); see also WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2010), 
available at http://www.weil.com/files/upload/Weil%20Dodd-Frank%20Overview.pdf (summariz-
ing the Act’s provisions); Challenges of the Next Proxy Season:  What to Expect from the Dodd-
Frank Act and How to Begin to Prepare, WEIL BRIEFING (July 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.weil.com/files/upload/NY_Briefing_Corp_Gov_ 
FRR_Full_List_100723_FINAL_THREE_Weil%20Briefing_SEC_CG%20July_2010_v4.pdf. 
 3. Note that Delaware has already acted to enable proxy access by private ordering.  Stock-
holders have always had the right, in Delaware at least, to have bylaw amendments proposed and 
voted on by the stockholders, including most recently proxy access.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 
112-13 (2009). 
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to fend off a “too-big-to-fail” scenario, and the regulations dealing with 
credit-rating agencies, hedge funds, issuers of securities products, deriva-
tives, and swaps. 
Those elaborate, detailed provisions that comprise most of the more 
than 2000-page Act are beyond the scope of this talk, which is about cor-
porate governance and the responsibility of directors for risk manage-
ment.  Although the rhetoric about “excessive risk” has driven many 
congressional efforts, the taking of prudent risks by directors, acting in 
accord with their state law fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, is the en-
gine of business strategy and is protected by the business judgment rule.  
The business judgment rule is alive and well, almost unharmed by this 
federal legislation, and it animates state internal corporate affairs law, as 
exemplified by Delaware court decisions. 
Corporate governance and other matters relating to the internal cor-
porate affairs of U.S. companies have historically been governed by the 
law of the state of incorporation.4  To be sure, the Dodd-Frank Act, like 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did with respect to audit committee responsibili-
ties and independence and audit committee and auditor independence 
requirements, includes provisions mandating certain actions and struc-
tures involving traditionally state law corporate governance matters.  
These include proxy access, say-on-pay and “golden parachute” votes, 
compensation committee composition and advisors, incentive compensa-
tion “clawback” policies, and special governance requirements for finan-
cial companies.5  Moreover, directors also will need to oversee manage-
ment’s compliance with the panoply of new regulations imposed by the 
Act.  Significantly, however, the Act’s provisions concerning say-on-pay 
votes and compensation committee advisors expressly disclaim any in-
tention “to create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of direc-
tors” or “to affect the ability or obligation of a compensation committee 
to exercise its own judgment in fulfillment of the duties of the compensa-
tion committee.”6  Other corporate governance proposals of some earlier 
bills, such as the attempted prohibition of staggered boards in the Schu-
mer Bill, are not included in the Act.7 
                                                 
 4. Vantagepoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1112 (Del. 2005). 
 5. WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, supra note 2. 
 6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 101st Cong. 
§§ 951–52 (as reported by the Committee of Conference, June 29, 2010). 
 7. SEC Disclosure and Corporate Governance, Congressional Watch: Senator Dodd Introduc-
es Financial Stability Bill Calling for SEC Proxy Access Authority and Other Governance and Ex-
ecutive Compensation, WEIL BRIEFING  (May 24, 2010), available at 
http://www.weil.com/files/Publication/8abe68bb-7941-4e2e-af64-
e3ad5702efee/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/419e2155-a01d-4955-a852-
f0d9a1664561/Weil_Briefing_SEC_CG_2010_05_24.pdf; see also Holly J. Gregory, Boards, Legis-
4 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1 
There may or may not be merit to some of the non-corporate gover-
nance provisions.  But let me say at the outset that, in my opinion, the 
corporate governance provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act are unnecessary.  
The financial meltdown of 2008–2009 was not, in my opinion, the result 
of a pervasive failure of good governance practices of the boards of the 
thousands of U.S. public companies. 
Under Delaware law, many advances have been put in place in re-
cent years, including majority voting (now the norm for most public 
companies) and proxy access under private ordering provisions of Dela-
ware law.  Indeed, it is the freedom of corporate private ordering, subject 
to fiduciary duties, that is the “genius of American corporate law.”8  The 
fundamental flaw of federalizing corporate law is that it is a “one-size-
fits-all” regime for thousands of diverse public corporations, each of 
which has its own culture and business model. 
To be sure, there have been some failures where directors were “as-
leep at the switch” and missed “red flags.”  That small minority of boards 
with bad practices is not, however, a justification for the across-the-board 
creation of these federal intrusions into internal corporate affairs, which 
traditionally (though not always) have been the exclusive province of the 
states.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 intruded to some extent.  And 
let me add that, in my opinion, state legislatures and state courts─led 
prominently by Delaware─have done a good job over the last century of 
enabling boards of directors to properly direct the management of the 
business and affairs of corporate America.  That includes risk assessment 
and risk management.  More about that later. 
That said, however, the anger of the American public and the re-
sponse in the media and in Congress have created a “drum beat” of rhe-
toric to “do something!”  That drum beat has focused, in large part, on 
“excessive risk-taking” (largely in financial institutions) as a major cul-
prit.  This rhetoric has resulted in calls for the scalps of CEOs, CFOs, 
directors, and other players in American business, with a wide swath of 
blame for all and for the corporate structure in which these players func-
tion.  So, corporate governance practices got erroneously swept up in the 
frenzy. 
HISTORY 
These federally-imposed corporate governance provisions will be 
somewhat problematic in practice, but they could be worse.  Consider 
                                                                                                             
lators, Regulators: Setting the Right Expectations, PRAC. L. J., May 2010, at 12 (discussing roles of 
and appropriate expectations for boards). 
 8. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993). 
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this thumbnail sketch of the history of federalism and attempts at federa-
lization in the area of corporate governance. 
Federal and state courts have made it quite clear that Congress has 
not yet federalized internal corporate affairs, except in disclosure and 
some other areas.9  Federal and state law have coexisted for many years, 
and internal corporate affairs remain the province of the state of incorpo-
ration.  Federal law, dating from the securities legislation of 1933 and 
1934 and going through the Williams Act of the 1980s, has long related 
primarily to disclosure issues. 
There are concurrent applications of federal and state authority.  
And there is strictly federal law and strictly state law.  Delaware has em-
braced this federalism model, and that phenomenon has led to the incor-
poration in Delaware of more than sixty percent of the Fortune 500 com-
panies. 
In the mid-1970s, Professor Cary of Columbia Law School, a for-
mer SEC Commissioner, said, “Delaware is leading the race to the bot-
tom,” and he wrote articles in the Yale Law Journal alleging that.  He 
said, “this pygmy state” (Delaware) should not be dominating the corpo-
rate system and that federal minimum corporate standards were needed.10 
At that time, there were some academic views that favored Cary’s 
preference for federal minimum standards of corporation law.  Many 
other people took quite a different view, saying the state system, particu-
larly that of Delaware, is working, and that a one-size-fits-all federal sys-
tem would not. 
Ralph Winter, then a Yale law professor and later a judge of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, articulated a very 
persuasive economic analysis.  He concluded “that state corporate legal 
systems do protect shareholders and that state regulation is generally pre-
ferable to federal regulation.”11  “An expanded federal role,” he said, 
“would . . . be counterproductive.  At the federal level, there is no me-
chanism by which optimum legal rules governing the shareholder-
corporation relation can be determined.”12  “Once federal legislation is 
                                                 
 9. See., e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991) (holding that federal court 
entertaining derivative action of company registered under Federal Investment Company Act of 
1940 must apply demand futility exception defined by state of incorporation); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. 
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (absent clear congressional intent, federal courts should be reluctant 
to federalize and override state corporate laws); see also E. Norman Veasey, What Would Madison 
Think? The Irony of the Twists and Turns of Federalism, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 41–42 (2009). 
 10. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L.J. 663, 701, 705 (1974). 
 11. See RALPH K. WINTER, JR., GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 5 (1978); see also 
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). 
 12. WINTER, supra note 11, at 44–46. 
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enacted,” he said, “it will be very difficult to correct . . . [and] even the 
most demonstrably foolish rule will lead to calls for more rather than less 
regulation.”13  So, all that happened coming out of this academic debate 
was the American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of Corporate Gover-
nance, which is offered by the ALI as a template for state corporation 
law.14 
We have had this fragile ecosystem of state and federal law in the 
corporate area, and it has been working.  That view carried the day in the 
late twentieth century.  But what would the future hold?  In 2001, along 
came Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, the bursting of the technology bubble, 
and the loss of $7 trillion in market capitalization.  That, of course, led to 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, an election year. 
That Act resulted in some intrusion into the internal affairs of cor-
porations, but I do not think it intrudes in many significant respects.  
Now if you analyze the things that it did that are properly in the federal 
lane, they seem to work: audit regulation, executive certification of fi-
nancial statements, prohibition of insider trades during pension-fund 
blackout periods, enhanced criminal penalties, and additional disclosure 
requirements.  But there are some provisions that are worrisome because 
they are clearly in the state lane: regulation of non-audit services, audit-
committees’ composition, executive bonuses, executive loans, and rules 
on lawyer conduct.15 
So, many observers think that Sarbanes-Oxley might have been 
much worse, might have been much more intrusive.  Moreover, aside 
from the high cost of Sarbanes-Oxley to small businesses, many people 
think that this law in the post-Enron environment has improved board 
conduct.  And although many governance improvements, some stimu-
lated by Delaware judges,16 were happening before Enron and before 
Sarbanes-Oxley, I think Sarbanes-Oxley, with all of its warts, has not 
been overly harmful. 
In the federalism area, we have to go back to something James 
Madison said nearly 235 years ago, in the context of the formulation of 
the U.S. Constitution, that is applicable to the federal-state tension in 
corporate law today.  He said: 
[T]he federal and State governments are . . . constituted with differ-
ent powers, and designed for different purposes. . . .  [T]he ultimate 
                                                 
 13. Id. 
 14. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1994). 
 15. E. Norman Veasey et al., Federalism vs. Federalization: Preserving the Division of Re-
sponsibility in Corporation Law, in 2 THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 
V-5-1 (John J. Huber et al. eds., 2006); Veasey, supra note 9, at 47. 
 16. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
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authority . . . will not depend merely on the comparative ambi-
tion . . . of the different governments . . . to enlarge its sphere of ju-
risdiction at the expense of the other . . . .  [C]hange can only result 
from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administra-
tion . . . .17 
I think that last sentence is worth repeating.  “[C]hange can only re-
sult from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administra-
tion . . . .”  So, will these federal corporate governance provisions make 
for a “better administration?”  I think not. 
This whole subject of federalism is fascinating, and it is particularly 
fascinating in the corporate area.  My speculation on the future is that 
Congress may chip away, depending on the scandal or perceived scandal 
or need du jour.  But I think it is unlikely in our lifetime that Congress 
will totally preempt state corporate law—I hope not, but it might! 
These Dodd-Frank governance provisions and some of the provi-
sions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act violate principles of federalism and may 
be—to some extent—the “camel’s nose in the tent” of federal interven-
tion in some internal corporate affairs.  But they do not, in themselves, 
represent a federal incorporation law or a sweeping imposition of mas-
sive “minimum federal standards” as proposed by Professor Cary in the 
1970s. 
The distinction between the academic debate of the ‘70s and the 
congressional activity of today is that then it was academics talking.  
They had no power to effect change.  Today it is politicians who are talk-
ing, and those politicians in Congress have plenary power!  In Dodd-
Frank they have exercised that power, but with only limited effect on 
state corporation law. 
That said, corporate directors need to be on guard that a “creeping 
federalization,” such as that represented by Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-
Frank, does not turn into a galloping federal takeover of corporate gover-
nance.  That takeover, whether creeping or galloping, could come as a 
congressional paroxysm in the wake of future scandals.  So, it behooves 
all of us to do what we can to encourage best corporate governance prac-
tices. 
Thus, we turn to the subject of risk management as the general area 
where future scandals involving “excessive risk-taking” may fuel a polit-
ically-perceived need to venture more robustly in the federalization di-
rection. 
                                                 
 17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 315–17 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW ON THE DIRECTORS’ DUTY OF OVERSIGHT 
I have my friend Professor Stephen Bainbridge, of UCLA Law 
School, to thank for much of the articulation that follows.18  In fact, I 
have paraphrased some of his prose.  First, we start with enterprise risk 
management, which is the process that boards of directors and executives 
undertake in understanding and executing the firm’s strategies and objec-
tives so as “to strike an optimal balance between growth and return goals 
and related risks.”19 
Although risk management is the job of senior management, the 
board of directors is responsible for ensuring that the corporation has 
established appropriate risk-management systems, much as they must 
establish compliance systems.  Moreover, the board must monitor man-
agement’s implementation of risk-management systems, much as they 
must do in the compliance arena. 
COMPLIANCE 
Derivative suits asserting lack of proper oversight claims against 
boards of directors culminated in the 1996 Caremark decision.  Care-
mark dicta stated that the board of directors has a duty to ensure that ap-
propriate “information and reporting systems” are in place to provide the 
board and top management with “timely, accurate information.”20 
The Caremark decision led to corporate-governance paradigms of 
board monitoring of law and financial-compliance systems as part of the 
board’s oversight duties.  So, on the surface at least, board monitoring 
responsibility for compliance systems appears to be a first cousin to the 
board’s duty to oversee risk management, although much of Professor 
Bainbridge’s scholarly analysis demonstrates that the relationship be-
tween the board’s role in compliance and the board’s role in risk man-
agement is much more complicated than that.21 
The risks that corporations face include operational, market, credit, 
and reputational risks.  Operational risk concerns inadequate systems, 
human error, and sometimes downright fraud.  Market risk includes firm 
activities and firm valuation linked to asset performance.  Credit risk 
centers around change in the credit quality of a counterparty that could 
affect the value of the director’s company.  Reputational risk is constant-
ly a worry because it may be the cause or the effect of the other risks.  
Just think of the catastrophe of the BP oil spill disaster that we see on 
                                                 
 18. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967 
(2009). 
 19. Id. at 967. 
 20. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 21. Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 978–84. 
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television constantly.  BP, for example, may be a demonstration of al-
leged operational risk failures that led inexorably to reputational melt-
downs and incalculable economic and market capitalization losses. 
As Professor Bainbridge observes, best practices with respect to 
risk management are still evolving.  He notes that this evolution is a 
function of the fact that “different firms have different appetites for risk 
and face different types of risk, which means they have differing enter-
prise risk management needs.”22 
Because the taking of prudent risks is inherently the engine of cor-
porate profit maximization, a risk-taking strategy is important.  A car 
running in neutral doesn’t go anywhere.  But prudence in risk-taking, 
today more than ever, must be part of the calculus of best practices in the 
standard of conduct for directors as they carry out their fiduciary duties 
of care and loyalty. 
I would like to pause for just a moment and set the framework of 
the corporate law of fiduciary duties and the exposure of directors to lia-
bility.  The first focus is on the standards of conduct and the second fo-
cus is on the standards of liability.23 
The standards of conduct are aspirational.  What should a board do 
in carrying out its responsibility to direct the management of the business 
and affairs of the corporation?  Clearly a board should strive for best 
practices of attention and uncompromising loyalty to the enterprise.  You 
all have been subjected to presentations and literature on best practices, 
including the 2007 fifth edition of the Corporate Director’s Guidebook24 
(now being updated to a sixth edition by the Committee on Corporate 
Laws), the NACD Key Agreed Principles,25 and other works.  But best 
practices do not define liability exposure.26 
The standards of liability form the lens through which a court or 
regulator will evaluate director conduct when that conduct is challenged 
in a proceeding.  In a derivative suit brought by a stockholder on behalf 
of the corporation against directors and officers, the court will deter-
mine—at the pleading stage or after trial—whether the facts pled or 
proven rebut the business judgment rule (which is a presumption of due 
care, good faith, and loyalty).27 
                                                 
 22. Id. at 970. 
 23. See, e.g., 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 8.30, 8.31 (4th ed. 2008, Supp. 2009). 
 24. ABA COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK (5th ed. 
2007), reprinted in 62 BUS. LAW. 1479 (2007). 
 25. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRECTORS, KEY AGREED PRINCIPLES TO STRENGTHEN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR U.S. PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS (2008), available at 
https://secure.nacdonline.org/StaticContent/StaticPages/DM/NACDKeyAgreedPrinciples.pdf. 
 26. Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27, 56–58 (Del. 2006). 
 27. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
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The fiduciary duty of due care requires directors to study and con-
sider all material information reasonably available in making a business 
decision.28  The fiduciary duty of due care likewise applies to the board’s 
oversight duties. 
Both duties of due care (in decision-making and in oversight) are 
tested by a gross-negligence standard,29 but ordinarily there can be no 
personal liability for damages against directors for lack of due care be-
cause of the widespread adoption of charter provisions implementing 
statutes permitting exculpation of monetary damages for breach of the 
duty of care.30  This exoneration does not apply to officers in most states 
and it does not apply to either directors or officers who are found to have 
violated their duty of loyalty, including failure to act in good faith.31 
The duty of loyalty requires that directors and officers act uncondi-
tionally in what they honestly believe to be the best interests of the cor-
poration.  They may not engage in any self-dealing or conduct them-
selves in a way that personally benefits them or their family or business 
associates at the expense of the corporation.  Moreover—and this is a 
recent clarification of Delaware law—they must act in good faith to carry 
out their duty of loyalty.  A lack of good faith is shown if directors inten-
tionally violated positive law or consciously disregarded or violated a 
known duty in either decision-making or oversight.32 
So, now I would like to focus on the board’s duty of oversight.  The 
Caremark33 decision by Chancellor Allen is the logical genesis of the 
analysis.  In 1994, the federal government indicted Caremark Interna-
tional, Inc., a healthcare corporation, for violating the Anti-Referral 
Payments Law.  Caremark settled the federal litigation, paid fines, and 
settled civil claims, all for approximately $250 million. 
Stockholders filed derivative suits in Delaware against Caremark’s 
board of directors for the losses.  These derivative suits were also settled, 
subject to court approval.  Then-Chancellor William Allen in 1996 ap-
proved the settlement but also authored important dicta on the oversight 
responsibilities of boards of directors.  And, as noted earlier, a board’s 
oversight responsibilities may be enhanced as a result of the regulatory 
provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act.  
These dicta have become enshrined as the key standards of liability 
under Delaware law in the oversight area and have, correspondingly, 
                                                 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2009). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006); Brehm, 906 A.2d at 66–67. 
 33. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
2010] Challenges for Directors 11 
framed best practices advice as the key standards of conduct in the area 
of compliance oversight.  The issue I would like to visit with you today 
is the extent to which the Caremark line of cases on oversight and com-
pliance are analogous in the context of risk assessment and risk man-
agement.  The key Caremark dicta are that the directors’ duty to be atten-
tive 
includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate in-
formation and reporting system, which the board concludes is ade-
quate, exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances 
may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses caused by 
non-compliance with applicable legal standards.34 
But, importantly, he added that “only a sustained or systematic fail-
ure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt 
to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists—will es-
tablish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”  
And he noted—significantly—that this standard sets the liability bar 
“quite high.”  He said such a claim is “possibly the most difficult theory 
in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judg-
ment.”35 
Caremark became a well-established standard for the duty of over-
sight and was followed both in the Delaware Court of Chancery as well 
as in other states.  But the Delaware Supreme Court did not expressly 
adopt it until ten years later in Stone v. Ritter,36 a decision authored by 
Justice Randy Holland for the court.  Stone was brought derivatively by 
stockholders of AmSouth Bancorporation against the board of directors, 
alleging a Caremark claim.  The suit alleged that the board failed to en-
sure that the bank had an adequate compliance program in place to pre-
vent and detect violations of the federal Bank Secrecy Act that had re-
sulted in large fines arising out of a “Ponzi scheme” perpetrated by some 
rogue employees.  This criminal activity was unknown to the directors in 
spite of the company’s compliance and information system.  The suit was 
dismissed for lack of a proper pleading of bad faith on the part of the di-
rectors. 
Stone held that conscious disregard of the board’s duties is the basis 
of liability in Caremark cases: 
We hold that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predi-
cate for director oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly failed to 
implement any reporting or information system or controls; or 
                                                 
 34. Id. at 970. 
 35. Id. at 967. 
 36. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
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(b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously 
failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves 
from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.  
In either case, imposition of liability requires a showing that the di-
rectors know that they were not discharging their fiduciary obliga-
tions.  Where directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to act, 
thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibili-
ties, they breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fi-
duciary obligation in good faith.37 
In Stone, the Supreme Court also confirmed the Caremark dictum 
that such an oversight claim “for employee failures is ‘possibly the most 
difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to 
win a judgment.’”38  The plaintiff was unable to clear that hurdle in 
Stone: 
With the benefit of hindsight, the plaintiffs’ complaint seeks to 
equate a bad outcome with bad faith. . . .  In the absence of red 
flags, good faith in the context of oversight must be measured by 
the directors’ actions “to assure a reasonable information and re-
porting system exists” and not by second-guessing after the occur-
rence of employee conduct that results in an unintended adverse 
outcome.39 
RISK MANAGEMENT 
Caremark claims typically involve a failure of oversight of law 
compliance or accounting irregularities.  A recent decision by Chancellor 
William Chandler in the Citigroup case demonstrates the (perhaps dis-
tant) kinship between the compliance/oversight calculus of Caremark 
and the standard of review in risk-management cases. 40 
As Professor Bainbridge notes, Citigroup faced at least three types 
of enterprise risk.  Market risk related to the fact that changes in interest 
rates and housing prices affected the value of Collateral Debt Obligations 
(CDOs) based on mortgage-backed securities.  Credit risk was implicated 
because of adverse changes in the credit quality of subprime mortgage-
backed securities.  Operational risk arose in the context of derivative se-
curities.41 
                                                 
 37. Id. at 370. 
 38. Id. at 372 (quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967). 
 39. Id. at 373. 
 40. Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 978 (citing In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Deriv. Litig., 964 
A.2d 106, 123 (Del. Ch. 2009)). 
 41. Id. 
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When the financial crisis hit and the subprime mortgage market col-
lapsed, the risks materialized and Citigroup suffered very serious finan-
cial losses.  Plaintiffs brought a derivative action charging the directors 
with a lack of good faith for knowingly disregarding a known risk be-
cause “red flags” foreshadowed these losses. 
In dismissing the bulk of the allegations of the complaint,42 Chan-
cellor Chandler observed a key distinction between oversight and strateg-
ic decisions governed by the business judgment rule: 
Although these claims are framed by plaintiffs as Caremark claims, 
plaintiffs’ theory essentially amounts to a claim that the director de-
fendants should be personally liable to the Company because they 
failed to fully recognize the risk posed by subprime securities.  
When one looks past the lofty allegations of duties of oversight and 
red flags used to dress up these claims, what is left appears to be 
plaintiff shareholders attempting to hold the director defendants 
personally liable for making (or allowing to be made) business deci-
sions that, in hindsight, turned out poorly for the Company.  Dela-
ware Courts have faced these types of claims many times and have 
developed doctrines to deal with them—fiduciary duty of care and 
the business judgment rule.43 
I agree with Professor Bainbridge that just as the business judgment 
rule insulates risk-taking from judicial review, so Caremark should insu-
late risk management from judicial review.  Risk management necessari-
ly overlaps with risk-taking because the former entails making choices 
about how to select the optimal level of risk to maximize firm value. 
In connection with the current intense focus on risk, I would like to 
commend to your study the very recent report of the NACD Blue Ribbon 
Commission, entitled Risk Governance: Balancing Risk and Reward.44  
Here are just a few brief points from the report: 
Understanding the Critical Link Between Strategy and Risk 
Risk is not merely something to be avoided, mitigated, and mini-
mized; risk is integral to strategy and essential for a business to suc-
ceed.  Boards should encourage management to pursue prudent 
risks to generate sustainable corporate performance and value. 
*            *            * 
  
                                                 
 42. A claim alleging that certain executive compensation arrangements constituted waste sur-
vived the motion to dismiss.  Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138. 
 43. Id. at 124. 
 44. NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRECTORS, REPORT OF THE NACD BLUE RIBBON COMM’N, RISK 
GOVERNANCE: BALANCING RISK AND REWARD (2009). 
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The Role of the Board and Its Standing Committees 
While there is no one-size-fits-all solution, the Commission believes 
that, as a general rule, the full board should have primary responsi-
bility for risk oversight, with the board’s standing committees sup-
porting the board by addressing the risks inherent in their respective 
areas of oversight.  It is rare that any one committee—such as the 
audit committee or a risk committee—would have the time, re-
sources, and expertise to oversee the full range of risks facing a 
company.  Moreover, the critical link between strategy and risk 
points to the need for the full board—rather than any one commit-
tee—to have responsibility for risk. 
*            *            * 
While the full board likely does not have the time to consider each 
relevant risk in detail on an ongoing basis, it does have two basic 
responsibilities: 
• To ensure that management has implemented an appropri-
ate system to manage these risks, i.e., to identify, assess, 
mitigate, monitor, and communicate about these risks. 
• To provide effective risk oversight through the board’s 
committee structure and oversight processes. 
*            *            * 
Appendix B: 25 Questions Every Director May Wish 
to Consider 
Corporate profitability is driven by taking prudent risks after a well 
thought-out strategy is developed. . . .  Maintaining the status quo is 
a choice, but not always the best one. . . . 
In developing corporate strategy and a focus on risk, directors 
should probe management, advisors, and each other by asking at 
least the following twenty-five questions (though not necessarily in 
this order): 
1. What are we aiming to accomplish, and how (corporate 
strategy)? 
2. What alternative strategies have been consi-
dered/explored? 
3. Do the directors receive risk material which adequately 
distills vast quantities of risk information into prioritized, 
actionable summaries? . . . 
*            *            * 
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8. What could go wrong or derail our strategy?  For exam-
ple, could multiple problems arise simultaneously or se-
quentially (the “perfect storm”)? . . . 
*            *            * 
24. Has the board and have the appropriate committees re-
viewed the incentive structure with strategy and risks in 
mind? 
Caremark and Stone require “a sustained or systematic failure”45 on 
the board’s part.  But the failure to heed “red flags” does not necessarily 
translate into liability for lack of good faith.  Stone requires the board to 
have “consciously failed to monitor,” which requires “a showing that the 
directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obliga-
tions.”46  As noted, directors by statute are permitted to be protected by 
the corporate charter from liability for claims of gross negligence.47  To 
hold directors personally liable, a plaintiff must show a lack of good faith 
resulting in a violation not of the duty of care, but of the duty of loyalty. 
The Chancellor in Citigroup would not allow “plaintiffs to succeed 
on a theory that a director is liable for a failure to monitor business 
risk.”48  He found that such a claim threatened to undermine “the well 
settled policy of Delaware law by inviting courts to perform a hindsight 
evaluation of the reasonableness or prudence of directors’ business deci-
sions.”49  Just because large losses happen as a result of risks that mate-
rialized does not necessarily prove a risk-management failure.  To pa-
raphrase Justice Holland in Stone and Chancellor Chandler in Citigroup, 
plaintiffs and courts may not use hindsight to equate a bad outcome with 
bad faith. 
There is a concern that, when directors of Delaware corporations 
are sued in courts other than the Delaware Court of Chancery, judges in 
other jurisdictions applying Delaware law may find it difficult to distin-
guish between competent and negligent management when there are bad 
outcomes.  They may inadvertently slip into a hindsight bias and find 
such outcomes to have been foreseeable and therefore preventable.  “It is 
almost impossible for a court, in hindsight, to determine whether the di-
rectors of a company properly evaluated risk and thus made the ‘right’ 
business decision.”50 
                                                 
 45. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. 
 46. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 47. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2009). 
 48. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 126. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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I hope that a court outside of Delaware, following the Chancellor’s 
decision in Citigroup in the context of a bad outcome, should be able to 
avoid conflating strategic and conscious risk-taking exercised in good 
faith with the directors’ duties of oversight.  Yet, there can be situations 
where directors fail to act in good faith to monitor the potential disastr-
ous consequences of proper business judgment having gone bad for lack 
of controls or otherwise.  The law relating to risk is still evolving, and the 
prevalent media/political condemnation of “excessive risk” may drive 
some bad results in litigation, just as it apparently has driven Congress to 
assume (erroneously in my view) that pervasive corporate governance 
failures caused the 2008–2009 financial meltdown. 
CONCLUSION 
I conclude by saying that director conduct in risk assessment and 
risk management will continue to be guided primarily by state law—for 
now.  The limits of liability concerns for alleged lack of good faith by 
directors in risk cases are clear under Delaware decisions such as Citi-
group, which properly puts risk-taking in the business judgment column.  
Monitoring a strategic risk and setting up proper controls may be the 
possible touchstones of liability.  Nevertheless, some judges in the future 
might not perceive the correct analysis, so directors should continue to 
aspire to achieve best practices, such as those summarized in the NACD 
Blue Ribbon Report and the other sources I mentioned. 
